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AbSTRACT
The exploration of public trust towards a democratic government has taken dif-
ferent forms throughout history because it is a multi-dimensional and compli-
cated process determined by actions, inactions, political, social and economic 
processes and societal power relationships. It is widely accepted that good 
governance, in turn, is a crucial element in the process of building citizens’ 
trust in government. This implies that unethical, corrupt actions negatively af-
fect citizens’ trust, which is one of the reasons the relationship between social 
trust and governance has been a focal point of the academic and policy-making 
communities. The present case studies are based on primary and secondary 
qualitative research and deal with concerns such as those in South Africa and 
Brazil. They seek to explore the causal relationship between good governance 
and citizens’ trust and the effect of corrupt actions. Citizens’ trust takes differ-
ent forms that fluctuate from the ‘general’ to the ‘particular/specific’ and such 
realities have different effects on governance as well as the shaping of public 
policy, attitudes and political imperatives. In both of the aforementioned coun-
tries, issues of political, economic and social transformation and development 
are societal imperatives. Empirical studies on such relations of trust and good 
governance can pave the way forward in re-evaluating the differences, similari-
ties and forms of the struggle against corruption.
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ACRONUMS
●● ANC (African National Congress)
●● CGU (Comptroller General of Brazil)
●● DLTC (Driving Licence Testing Centre)
●● ESC (Enforce Security Company)
●● GTSC (Globe Track Security Company)
●● IEC (Independent Electoral Commission)
●● IEC (Independent Electoral Commission)
●● MP (Member of Parliament)
●● PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
●● SARS (South African Revenue Services)
●● TB (Tuberculosis)
INTRODUCTION
Trust in a government is determined by a multiplicity of political, economic and social 
factors, and takes different forms. There is no doubt that the reality and/or perceptions of 
good and ethical governance of a State are one of the key ingredients shaping levels of trust 
or distrust. Actual or perceived public sector corruption erodes trust in both politicians and 
public officials despite the fact that obligations and duties of the elected political leaders 
are less specific and more conflictual in nature, when compared to those of civil servants. 
Citizens’ trust or distrust take a wide variety of forms that have direct or indirect effects on 
governance, the shaping of public policy, attitudes and political imperatives.
This article utilises a qualitative empirical framework to explore the causal relationship 
between good governance and citizen trust, and the effect of corrupt actions in Brazil 
and South Africa.
ON GOOD GOvERNANCE AND TRUST
Amongst the most prevalent questions in the public domain in today’s global scene is 
‘When will this thing (corruption) end?’ It is certainly not a simple question to answer 
as the phenomenon has over the years become multi-layered, nation-wide, compli-
cated and repetitive (Kaufmann et al. 2009; Woods & Mantzaris 2012).
Corruption is considered the most significant diversion and distortion of good gover-
nance that is basically a process through which a government exercises its power to 
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manage a country ethically, through an honest and transparent utilisation of its human, 
natural and social resources for the equitable, effective and efficient development of 
the entire population (Kane 2008:46–47; Kaufmann et al. 2009: 4–5; Rotberg and 
Gisselquist 2009:10–11).
It can be understood that such a generic conceptualisation can be supplemented with 
concrete examples that verify or negate ‘good governance’ such as accountability, 
transparency, political stability, peaceful co-existence, efficiency and effectiveness 
at all layers of government, democratic representation, adherence to the rule of law, 
developmental objectives, and corruption control (Kurtz & Schrank 2007; Gisselquist 
2012:18–19).
The trust that people bestow on a government and its officials, state institutions, and 
executives, differs significantly from interpersonal trust because of the multi-faceted 
nature and complexities of the system (Newton 2001:201–204).
However, there are principally political acts such as corruption, lack of ethics, state 
capture and perpetual legal violations that lead to mistrust and threaten the very le-
gitimacy of the system or non-compliance to the law by citizens (Newton 2001:205; 
Dalton 2004).
Political trust is founded on good governance that is based on the existence of 
ethical codes and accountability mechanisms in all spheres of human life. Such an 
understanding implies that citizens have an expectation of good and ethical gover-
nance at all levels of society. This reality pinpoints the fact that politicians and public 
administrators are obligated and expected to adhere to the principles of account-
ability, transparency and integrity, that are the cornerstones of anti-corruption mea-
sures such as detection, prevention and deterrence (Woods and Mantzaris 2012:121; 
Gisselquist 2012:10).
The inevitability of citizens’ expectations of a corrupt-free and healthy society is in-
strumental in the building and nurturing of feelings of trust towards a political regime 
(Kaufmann et al. 2009:5). Policies and the way they are planned and implemented 
nurture or destroy trust, as they are the foundation of the principles and actions of 
service delivery. This means that political trust is not won by fancy and verbose party 
manifestos, distribution of food parcels or pre-election promises, but by politicians’ 
and administrators’ actions. When citizens believe or realise that manifestos, poli-
cies and promises are forgotten, mistrust emerges and takes different forms. These 
forms are rooted in contrasting individual and group ideas, perceptions, relationships 
and actions, creating social and political outcomes that illustrate a mixture of power 
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relations, as well as contradictions created through societal or other realities (Tonkiss 
et al. 2000:21; Moreno 2001).
Political mistrust is directed at individual politician/s, political parties or institutions 
of the state or towards the political system in its totality. This because in most socie-
ties, actions/ inactions, decisions or/and policies are in perpetual social and political 
scrutiny that starts from the lower echelons of the public administration terrain, moves 
upwards to Municipal Manager at local level, and then impacts the higher echelons of 
the state apparatus (Moreno 2002:496–7).
Good governance basically depends, though not exclusively, on the existence of ethi-
cal codes and accountability mechanisms that are structured and operationalised in 
such a way as to not only detect corruption decisively and effectively, but also to 
enact a process and instrument of monitoring and evaluation (Nanda 2006:273–275; 
Landman & Larizza 2010:21–24). Such an evaluation will be planned and designed 
in a way which has to assess the levels of service delivery as well as their strengths, 
weaknesses, gaps and possibilities for the future (Thomas 2010:32–33).
Given the historical circumstances of the transition period in both South Africa and 
Brazil, the foundation of the new good governance system ought to be based on eco-
nomic and social transformation at all levels and layers of government; modernisation 
of the public service that would hopefully lead to outstanding service quality, mainly 
independent from political pressures; high quality of policy formulation and quality 
of financial management as well as trust and confidence in the government’s com-
mitment to implement their policies morally ethically, and transparently and a state of 
being free of corruption (World Governance Indicators 2013).
Both Brazil and South Africa have, over the years, built an assortment of organisational 
structures and processes aimed at strengthening accountability chains through legisla-
tion, rules and regulations. These are planned in such a way as to be able to identify 
weaknesses, gaps and inconsistencies in the strict implementation of the legislative 
framework (Mantzaris & Pillay 2013:114; Peishakhin 2012:266–267; Peishakhin & 
Pinto 2010:130–132).
Within this context, it can be understood that the citizens of both countries expect 
good governance and the continuous promotion of a high standard of professional 
ethics in the public service, where elected politicians and administrators will agree and 
work in unison in respect of governance monitoring, issues of effectiveness, efficiency 
and economy in service delivery and subsequent compliance evaluations, professional 
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ethics and detection, prevention, deterrence, monitoring, analysing, investigating, and 
responding to corruption (Woods & Mantzaris 2012).
Citizens ask questions relating to their lives and those of politicians and public ad-
ministrators because their well-being relies largely on the honesty, accountability and 
legitimacy upon which administrative mechanisms operate within a democracy that is 
corrupt-free and healthy (Veenstra 2002:549–550).
Trust is always multi-layered, complicated, both individual and collective, and inter-
personal, and is manifested through perceptions, feelings, relationships, planning and 
action. It could be described as the illustration of all human contact and institutional 
interaction (Tonkiss et al. 2000).
When Warren (2006) wrote that the issue of trust surfaces each time a new policy is 
announced, he spoke about political trust which is based on knowledge or lack there-
of; understanding; judgement that takes wide ranging forms and can be individually-
based (towards a President, provincial politician or administrator, or local government 
leader); collective (towards politicians in general, the judiciary or regional administra-
tors), or systemic (the entire political system).
On most occasions, the systemic overlaps with the personal trust or distrust of gov-
ernment because policy non-direction or implementation of weaknesses tend to be 
personified by the Mayors, the President or the Minister of the State. This is because in 
many instances peoples’ evaluation of performance/s concentrates largely on a familiar 
face/s or the overall political system managed and led by the State and its apparatuses 
(‘the regime’, according to Christensen & Laegreid 2003:3–4).
Citizen trust in state institutions or ruling or/and opposition parties, is a serious ba-
rometer of a healthy democracy because it epitomises the very essence of democratic 
legitimacy that is both internalised and externalised by peoples’ zest for wholehearted 
willingness to participate and act in the building of a democratic State that rewards 
honesty and punishes corruption.
Trust is not, on the one hand, built only on the mere promulgation of progressive 
social and economic policies, but above all their effective and efficient implementa-
tion (Thompson 2004). On the other hand, a society that is politically polarised and 
unstable with a political and administrative structure characterised by corruption, 
fragmented power and lack of consensus, is prone to loss of trust that could lead to 
a crisis, because perpetual and uncontrollable corruption leads to social polarisation 
and instability (Ostrom & Walker 2003). Political trust, in most instances, leads to 
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increased political involvement on the part of citizens and subsequently higher elec-
toral participation and activism (Chanley et al. 2000:240–241).
High levels of the lack of trust amongst citizens leads to loss of confidence and 
dissatisfaction in democracy. Extremely low levels of trust amongst citizens leads to 
long periods of social, localised, provincial or national protest action, and violence 
and destabilisation that can result in destructive consequences for governments and 
governance in general (Bovaird & Loeffler 2005:144–145; Catterberg & Moreno 
2006:39–40).
In many ways, distrust amongst citizens leads to hopelessness (Giddens (1990:49) 
that is created through human and group societal relationships, rooted for a number 
of writers in a ‘personal’ element in decisions related to it (Denters et al. 2004: 8; 
Sztompka 1999:12 -13).
THE RESEARCH METHODS
This project is based on case studies rooted on contemporary events utilising both 
qualitative research methods such as direct observation, interviews and primary and 
secondary documentary analysis (Bryman & Bell 2007:25). It is based on the study 
of official national, provincial and municipal documents, municipal council meetings, 
and data from unstructured interviews with government officials, researchers and 
experts in Brazil who have first-hand information on these issues. The respondents’ 
anonymity and confidentiality was guaranteed.
THE CASE STUDIES
Hereunder is the presentation of case studies in South Africa and Brazil.
South Africa
In South Africa, the case study revolves round a rural local municipality which is 
situated approximately 50km north of Durban in the KwaZulu-Natal Province with 
a population of 140 000. Its land mass is basically owned by a tribal trust controlled 
by the King of the Zulu people. It is inhabited by a population which primarily resides 
in traditional rural settlements and its agricultural land, predominantly sugarcane, ac-
counts for at least a third of land mass of the municipal area. It has a town as a service 
centre. There is a well-structured industrial area in the middle of the underdeveloped 
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and poverty-stricken area situated between the urban ports of Durban and Richards 
Bay, which has an import and export facilities infrastructure.
There is wide-spread poverty with a dependency rate of 60% and an unemployment 
rate of 28.6%, of which 34.6% comprises the youth. About 40.4% of the population 
has no source of income, while 24.3% earn less than R400 per month; approximately 
64.7% of the population in the municipality live below the poverty line. Around 26% 
of the municipality’s households have access to piped water inside their dwelling, 
while the large numbers of patients are co-infected with other conditions, that is, a 
high correlation to Tuberculosis (TB; Statistics South Africa 2011).
There is a cycle of corruption in the municipality. One of the most daring cases oc-
curred when, following the end of the five year contract of the municipality’s security 
private company (GTSC), a new service provider was awarded the contract (Enforce 
Security Company-ESC). There was no open tender in this instance as required by the 
relevant supply chain and procurement laws and regulations, and the new company 
tariffs were four times higher compared to the previous one (R260 000 as opposed 
to R60 000 per month).They did not possess the necessary resources to execute their 
mandate (Natal Hansard 2010).
The new security company belonged to the husband of the Provincial Minister of Local 
Government who also won a significant number of tenders throughout the province, 
including the eThekwini Municipality (Durban), where all tender processes were vio-
lated for the award, as outlined in the Manase Report of 2012 (Dube 2012).
While corruption continued, the Minister employed a forensic investigation which rec-
ommended that the municipal manager be suspended and appear before a disciplin-
ary committee. A special council sitting ratified the key recommendations regarding 
the transgressions and corruption, and suspended the municipal manager while other 
politicians and office bearers implicated in wrongdoing were not even reprimanded 
(Personal Interviews 1 and 2; Municipal Council Minutes February, 2011; KwaZulu-
Natal Hansard 2011).
The municipal manager waited for over five months for a disciplinary hearing that 
did not take place. However, he was head-hunted and appointed as a municipal 
manager at a larger municipality in the Midlands in KwaZulu-Natal, and within 
several months he was appointed as the Head of the newly established Municipal 
Academy under the auspices of the eThekwini Municipality (Personal Interview 3). 
He was replaced permanently by a former municipal manager from an Eastern Cape 
Province municipality, who was dismissed because he had handed-out illegal loans 
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to administrative senior officials and councillors, including the chief financial officer 
(Personal Interviews 1 and 3).
One of the seminal cases of corruption through collusion occurred when hundreds of 
thousands of Rands were set aside for the Mayoral bodyguards’ firearms trainings. The 
money was utilised to purchase a Golf 6 GTI for the Mayor. The purchase was never 
debated and no resolution was taken in a Council meeting (KZN Hansard 2013).
The municipal manager also increased the intern’s salaries (a number of whom were 
his or certain councillors’ relatives) without the authorisation of the relevant commit-
tees of the council. Family members were also appointed to divisions within the mu-
nicipality without repercussions (Personal Interviews 1 and 2).
The control of the Supply Chain Management (SCM) and procurement systems by 
the Municipal Manager implied that the appointment of companies without following 
proper procedure became a norm, including appointing firms of attorneys on a reten-
tion basis (Auditor-General 2014).
The well-publicised case in the municipality involved fraud involving the Chief 
Inspecting Officer of the Municipal Testing Station and 10 officials from the Driving 
License Testing Centre (DLTC). The syndicate comprising of approximately 10 to 15 
municipal staff members. Driving schools sold fake drivers’ licenses to thousands of 
citizens over a number of years. Those who got these licences did not even go to the 
test grounds and the Inspective Officer (mastermind) with seven officials (examin-
ers), two administration clerks, and one driving school owner, were arrested (KZN 
Hansard 2011, February). Their case, including the postponements, continued for 
over three and a half years. The ‘mastermind’ faced over 200 charges of racketeering, 
corruption and fraud under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 1998, but the 
State could not prove that the accused acted together. All the witnesses who worked 
at the municipality, including senior and middle managers who were aware of the 
situation for years, pleaded complete ignorance of the happenings. Furthermore, the 
municipality could only produce the rubber-stamped ‘evidence’ from the driving 
centre. Other witnesses from the municipality did not testify at all, while a number 
of them recanted elements of their statements (Personal Interviews 1, 2 and 3). All 
were acquitted.
Over the years, while fraud and corruption continued unabated, thousands of the mu-
nicipality’s residents protested on a number of occasions, calling for investigations into 
all allegations of fraud, corruption, lack of service delivery and nepotism by councillors 
and officials, primarily targeting the municipal manager and the mayor.
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There have been a number of considerable but scattered ‘service delivery protests’ 
between 2011 and 2016 in the municipality. During these protests, the majority of 
the informal settlement residents, generally comprising of approximately 1 000–1 500 
residents, threw stones at the police and passing cars. The reply was replete with 
rubber bullets, tear gas and water-canons. These were accompanied by many pub-
lic violence dockets. On several occasions, the protests turned more violent and the 
protesters burnt a number of state buildings including the local Social Development 
Department’s offices and other municipal infrastructure.
In 2016, very large section of the community in the municipality became active and 
destroyed and burnt vehicles, buildings and business premises, demanding the removal 
of one name from the election list, that of the previous mayor (MetroTell 2016).
Businesses, a school and a clinic were held ransom and over 5 000 people went on 
a continuous rampage burning factories and vehicles in the protests. Police spread 
chemicals and fired rubber bullets before they arrested and charged 122 people for 
public violence, arson and malicious damage to property. Following continuous com-
munity mobilisation and further violence demanding their release, those held in a local 
prison were released after several days. The release followed the political intervention 
by the present mayor and a high powered delegation from the provincial ANC, who 
met with the community at a gathering attended by over 5 000 people to be addressed 
by the politicians (Daily News 2016).
Within a week, eight factories and property were destroyed, with damage running into 
millions of Rands. These realities above all threatened the livelihood of over 25 000 
workers who rely on local industries for jobs. The businesses which were burnt down 
are still negotiating with their insurance companies because the future of 25 000 work-
ers was at stake (Citizen 2016; Daily News 2016; eNCA 2016; Mercury 2016; MetroTell 
2016).
Distrust can be very destructive.
The repercussions of distrust in South Africa
In the South African public opinion, the recently released political terrain opinion polls 
of existing levels of trust paint a bleak picture. The Afrobarometer survey that took 
place during August-September 2015 (Afrobarometer 2016), revealed that there have 
been a number of events of a political, individual and economic nature that signifi-
cantly affected trust negativity. Tough economic realities for the poor and substantial 
sections of the working and middle classes, including the ‘Nkandla affair’, had very 
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direct negative effects in respect of public trust. The continuous negative headlines 
on such issues magnify a series of corrupt activities that contributed significantly to a 
serious decrease in public and political trust.
In comparative terms, popular trust in the President has dropped radically since 2011, 
standing at 34% (62% in 2011). This is the second-lowest level since the first research 
findings that appeared in 2000. The analysis also revealed that more than half of the 
openly declared ANC voters indicated that they had no trust in the President of the 
country and the ruling party.
However, trust in provincial premiers, local government councils and officials, mem-
bers of Parliament (MPs), provincial premiers, local government councils, the ruling 
party, and opposition parties, has also declined significantly, making political leaders 
the least-trusted public officials in the country. Trust in the President is lowest of all 18 
institutions and leaders.
The survey revealed that among other state institutions, the courts of law, the police 
and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) lost trust over the past four years, 
while trust in the South African Revenue Services (SARS), the Office of the Public 
Protector, and the National Prosecuting Authority remained stable. It was also revealed 
that the independent broadcast media enjoy significant high public trust, climbing 
from 69% in 2011 to 79%.
The Afrobarometer survey (2016:3) stated that “increasing dissatisfaction with South 
Africa’s current leadership has spilled over into waning support for democracy itself”. 
The lack of trust in political institutions and individuals holding political power such 
as the President, has a direct negative effect on the voting patterns in the country. 
The empirical evidence relates the story concretely. Over the years, the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) has introduced well-publicised voter registration drives 
which have had varying degrees of success. In comparative terms, the lack of trust 
can be perceived as one of the key reasons for large number of registered citizens not 
voting. In 1999, of the 18 million registered, 16.2 million voted. In 2009, the number of 
registered voters had increased to 23.1 million but only 17.9 million voted. In the 2014 
elections, there were 25.3 million registered voters but only 18.4 million voted, while 
in the 2016 municipal elections, 57.9% of those registered voted. This was higher than 
those who voted in 2011 (57.6%). The key issue that is not mentioned by analysts, is 
that comparatively, more than 1.5 million had registered as voters (IEC 2016:9).
Corruption appears to be an increasingly significant barrier to improved public service 
delivery (OECD 2013:6).
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Brazil
in Brazil’s local municipalities, the most reported and recorded cases of corruption 
take place through the operations of ‘mediators’ who deal with politicians and/or 
administrators in the supply chain and procurement sections. There are cases of a 
Renault Traffic purchased as an ambulance priced at approximately $4 000–6 000 per 
purchase (Foreign Policy 2015:2–3). Such corruption is difficult to detect as it requires 
both a shallow as well as broad angle perception, because initially it does not cause 
alarm. This implies that in many instances it is widespread, and whistle-blowers are 
rare because they fear for their jobs and lives.
Despite the belief that the Comptroller General of Brazil (CGU) has become efficient 
in inspecting municipal finances, one of the most important cases they managed to 
solve was the mediators’ involvement in a well-planned national syndicate ambulance 
peddling scheme. It was of notable success because it was a massive scheme (Power 
& Taylor 2011:23).
This was a somewhat mediating operation utilising supply chain management and pro-
curement manipulation and political connectivity, as well as the active participation 
by a number of companies that were exposed in the investigation for supplying high 
overpriced ambulances to a number of municipalities (Foreign Policy 2015:4–5). This 
corruption cycle had to be investigated by the federal police. Unfortunately, to date, 
there has been no outcome. This scheme took place in 19 of the 26 states in the coun-
try. The mediators and parliamentary staff colluded with ‘cooperative’ mayors who 
were instrumental in facilitating federal budget amendments that led to the same group 
of companies winning all municipal tenders for ambulances at approximately 120 per 
cent above the market price (Zamboni & Litschig 2015:23).
The ‘connected’ conspirators in the system shared the circulated kickbacks. It was esti-
mated that over 300 mayors were directly involved in the act and were referred to in the 
media as the protagonists in the “Scandal of the Bloodsuckers”. When investigations were 
completed, Parliament ordered proceedings against and impeachment of 69 federal depu-
ties and three senators. However, this remains unresolved. Bearing in mind the existence of 
5 570 municipal councils in the country and the levels of corruption, one can just imagine 
the effects of ‘re-writing’ manipulated books, falsifying budget outcomes and continuous 
break-ins at municipal council establishments from which computers, laptops, cell phones 
and official documents are stolen and never recovered (Brollo et al. 2013:1760:1).
It has been confirmed that many corrupt mayors have avoided the might of the 
law over a number of years because of their affiliation to the governing party, and 
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central government treats them lightly. This is despite the fact that as punishment, 
their spending has been reduced by the federal governments. There is also evidence 
showing corrupt leaders who escape the law because they are considered ‘capable’ 
of delivering services to the people despite their illegal deeds and illegal transac-
tions. It has been said that corruption is unpopular but politicians who are active 
and satisfy the needs of people, are popular irrespective of their behaviour (Avis 
et al. 2017:22).
These are politicians who utilise what is left over from corruption in popular infrastruc-
tural or other popular needs. They are the adherents of rouba mas faz (“he steals but 
he gets things done”, from Ferraz & Finan 2008:705). Although the CGU utilises exist-
ing policy to fine or dismiss corrupt politicians or administrators, the looting continues 
(Poverty Action Lab 2011).
The repercussions of distrust in Brazil
Following the much debated “Lula moment” and the series of corrupt acts in the 
higher, middle and lower echelons of the Brazilian government, its popularity 
plummeted significantly. The majority of the country’s population blamed relent-
less corruption as the primary reason. By late 2015, 78% of the respondents of a 
countrywide public opinion survey did not trust the President and the government 
because they are involved in corruption while a mere 9% believed that the country’s 
economy would improve in the next 5 to 10 years (Alvez 2016:7). In the latest opin-
ion polls, the citizens scathed the former President Rousseff, the newly appointed 
President, Temer, as well as and Lula da Silva, who was previously considered the 
most revered leader.
A Gallup poll in April 2016 revealed that only 26% of the respondents believed that 
Brazil’s politicians will become more honest, while 53% felt that nothing would change 
in the country. Only 23% said that the country’s Congress cares for or acts in the inter-
ests of the people. When asked if they thought Congress was acting on behalf of the 
public’s interest during the ongoing impeachment process, only 23% replied in the af-
firmative while 63% said no. Fifty eight per cent (58%) of those involved in the survey 
supported Roussef’s impeachment which followed an alleged illegal act that broke the 
budget laws under Article 85 of the Brazilian Constitution. Overall, there was a general 
agreement amongst both camps that nothing would change for the better in Brazil.
In the 2016 municipal elections, despite the fact that all the Brazilians are obliged by 
law to vote, the abstention rate stood at 17.5% in nationwide polls, 2% less than in 
2014. It must be borne in mind that abstention is penalised by a fine unless the voters 
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submit satisfactory reasons for abstaining. The refusal to vote and the high number of 
blank and spoiled ballots highlighted a high level of disillusionment by the people in 
their politicians (Xinhua 2016:2).
It was a serious degree of disenchantment with the governing élites that pinpointed an 
unprecedented lack of trust and the need for political change. One can understand 
such sentiments when over 50 politicians in the country have been under investigation 
for a number of corrupt acts that seriously diminished the peoples’ confidence in the 
country’s political establishment (Ribeiro 2016:8).
Following the massive corruption in the state-run oil company, Petrobras, including 
a number of smaller ones, the Workers’ Party was defeated in a number of key con-
stituencies which included mayors and local council members across Brazil. However, 
what was more pertinent for the political future was the abstention, for example, in 
Sao Paulo, where 21.8% did not vote, 11.5% of the votes were spoiled, and 5.3% were 
left blank. Moreover, a top businessman, Joao Doria, was victorious in the largest city, 
Sao Paulo, because his election manifesto expressed the lack of trust for politicians and 
belief in a business-orientated, non-political governance (Alvez 2016:7). In the second 
largest city, Rio de Janeiro, Temer’s PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) 
was defeated; 24.3% of the population abstained, 12.7% spoilt their votes and 5% left 
theirs blank (Plus 55 2016).
EvALUATION OF ACTIONS WITH RESPECT 
TO PUbLIC TRUST AND CORRUPTION 
IN SOUTH AFRICA AND bRAZIL
The realities facing democratically elected governments in Brazil and South Africa in 
terms of expressing their government distrust and its direct and strong relationship with 
corruption in both countries, have similarities and differences. In South Africa, the ab-
stention of voting in national and local government elections is higher in comparison, 
but in Brazil voter abstention is heavily punished in monetary terms. In well-respected 
public opinion polls based on popular citizen perceptions and experiences, both 
country’s governments, politicians and public servants are not trusted by very strong 
majorities of the respective populations. There are differences in respect of public 
mobilisation of citizens against corruption in government, as in South Africa public 
protests that on many occasions turn violent, take place throughout the country. In 
Brazil they are more massive, but concentrate on major urban centers. The common 
feeling is that corruption in both cases leads to citizens’ distrust that occasionally leads 
to regime change, as the case in Brazil , but not South Africa.
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CONCLUSION
It is evident that although corruption in both countries, Brazil and South Africa, have 
common roots , the peoples’ actions and reactions have similarities and differences .
This can be understood through an historical and contemporary understanding of the 
political, cultural, economic and social realities as well as the multi-dimensional and 
complicated process of good governance violations that lead to distrust.
The exploration of the causal relationships between expected good governance, cor-
ruption and citizen trust that have affected the actions of the citizens, has shown that 
corruption in all its forms leads to citizen distrust and actions in a wide variety of 
societal terrains and locations.
The case studies are instrumental in understanding how corruption erodes public trust 
in municipalities and extends to the national level. Corrupt acts bear important repercus-
sions for politicians and administrations, and despite the differences in committing them, 
the results and the popular response are in the final analysis similar in shaping beliefs and 
attitudes. The key difference lies in the forms that these sentiments take in terms of com-
munities’ actions. In South Africa, the lack of public and political trust sometimes takes 
on a violent character even in rural or peri-urban areas, but in Brazil the most vociferous 
protests are concentrated primarily in urban areas such as Sao Paulo or Rio De Janeiro.
When the population believes that corruption is the direct antithesis of growth, devel-
opment and social transformation empirical studies on such relations of trust and good 
governance can pave the way forward in re-evaluating the differences, similarities and 
forms of the struggle against corruption.
The key question that arises remains: How can trust be regained when laws, rules and 
regulations are disregarded by the mayor’s offices?
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